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Defendants and Appellees Gregory Smedsrud and LouAnn Smedsrud submit the
following Appellees' Brief in the above-referenced proceeding.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellees agree with Appellant's statement of jurisdiction of this case.
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL
The parties to the appeal are Plaintiff and Appellant J. Pochynok Company, Inc.
(hereafter "Plaintiff/Appellant" or "Pochynok"), and Defendants and Appellees Gregory
Smedsrud and LouAnn Smedsrud (hereafter "Defendants/Appellees" or "Smedsruds").
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the lower court erred in granting to Defendants/Appellees all

attorneys' fees incurred after May 9, 2002, pursuant to Utah Code Arm. § 38-1-18(3), by
reason of Appellant's refusal of Appellees' Offer of Judgment made on that date, in that
this action was filed before enactment of that provision by the Utah Legislature.
2.

Whether the lower court erred in granting to Defendants/Appellees all costs

and attorneys' fees incurred in this matter before May 9, 2002, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §§38-1-17 and 38-1-18.
3.

Whether the lower court erred in upholding Defendants/Appellees' writ of

garnishment to Zions First National Bank, in that Plaintiff/Appellant failed to offer
evidence, or otherwise to establish, that the funds on deposit in its depository account
were not its property.

594240vl
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Issue 1 ib a question of law relating to the retroactivity of the statute relied on,
which this Court review's for correctness - J ODM

.

,

. :t

l s s u e 2 concerns the trial court's apportionment of costs (including attorru;\ s" fees)
under Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-17 and 38-1-18 As applicable case law c i o u ^ ihi ;* u\\
court with discretion in this analysis, its decisioi i ii i tf lis i egai (1 is i e
•.

'

I

\\>muvt, 18 Utah 2d 130, 4i/l\2d-140^1900),

AK&R Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy 47 P.3d 92 (UT App 2002); Aui v Jlolden,
I \ P. 3(1781 (Utah 2002).
Issue'..-.-.
is go\ ei i led

•

-•

•

P. *!,'.-• .-

* - noneous slandaid - see Morse v. Packer, 15 P.3d 1<0* ^

!

.!>

2000).
STATEMEN 1 OF THE CASE
. . . -* .

.-..;*

tm" f -m-i

Mate of

I Jtah. Defendant aiiu -rwllecs Gregory Smedsrud and LouAnn Smedsrud, as owners,
were sued by Plaintiff/Appellant J. Pochynok Company, Inc. for breach of contract and
quantum meiml Plamlili and Appellant I I i'lii"i mol i 'iim|iiin\ l'uitlni soiij'"lnl lo
^

'..uuc b liens asserted against the Defendants/Appellees'

residence. Defendants and Appellees counterclaimed, asserting defective workmanship
and it icompletion of the project.

594240vi
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The matter was set for jury trial commencing May 21, 2002. On May 9, 2002,
counsel for Defendants and Appellees presented Plaintiff/Appellant with an offer of
judgment in the amount of $40,000 (see Addendum 1 hereto, R 408-410). Plaintiff/
Appellant declined the offer, and the case proceeded to trial.
The case was tried to a jury on May 21-22, 2002. In its case in chief
Plaintiff/Appellant initially claimed $81,269.91 in damages (having plead $74,360.51 in
its complaint - R. 1-6; 200-207); during the course of trial, though, Plaintiff/Appellant
was inconsistent in the computation of its claim. Defendants/Appellees put on
substantial proof concerning unearned supervisor fees, defective work which had to be
redone, or which diminished the value of the home. Following deliberation, the jury
returned a verdict (net of offsets) of only $7,096.00 for Plaintiff/Appellant.
See Addendum 2 hereto (R. 354-355). Plaintiff/Appellant does not appeal the jury
verdict.
On May 31, 2002, Defendants and Appellees moved the court for an order taxing
costs and attorneys' fees which they had incurred in the litigation. Plaintiff/Appellant
J. Pochynok Company opposed the motion of Defendants and Appellees, and filed its
own motion for an award of costs and fees. Both parties submitted evidence of costs and
attorneys' fees in the form of affidavits by legal counsel.
By minute entry dated July 25, 2002 (R. 621-622), the trial court granted
Defendant/Appellees' motion to tax costs and attorneys' fees, and denied

594240v1
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Plaintiff/Appellant's motion. Judgment u p o n the verdict was thereupon entered b y the
Court on August !>, 2002 as lollows:
a.

Jiidgiiinii iv i* Dili | mi I'M ii of Plaintiff I Pocbynok C o m p a m ,

Inc., and against Defendants Gregory Smedsrud and Lou Ann Smedsrud,
jointly and severally, in the amount of $7,076.56, together with interest
tliei eon fi on: i i ai i i aftei IV la.) r 22. 2002 i n itil paid ii i fit ill at tl le • :onti act i ate of
I *o o p C r a m i u l I L
b.

Judgment was entered in f a u i -)f T \ f/mhnts Gregory and I nuAnn

Smedsrud, jointly and severally, as

\ t I . hi iff J. I 'och> i 10k

Compam , Ii IC ii i the fc lie ( • >«
i.

$1,906.94, representing Defendants' costs of suit incurred

prioi t< i May 9, 2002;
ii.
i

iii.

VIK,()tt -i Hi representing Defenda:
> ;?oo),

$766.50, representing Defendants' costs of suit incurred on

and after M a y 9, 2002;
iv.

1> ? 4,JMi Ilu irpii'sriiluii 1 ni N'lnnl mis' iiifniinn s" fors iin nnvd

on and after M a y 9, 2002; and
v.

Interest was awarded on the foregoing amounts from and after

I\ la> 22, 2002 i intil j >aid ii i fi ill \ ii 1 1 le c< n t! i \ i d i; ; i/l c < >f 1 2 ( ! /0.

594240v1
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The Judgment further denied Plaintiff/Appellant's petition for foreclosure of its
mechanic's lien against the residence of Defendants/Appellees, holding that
Plaintiff/Appellant held no right, title or interest therein. See Addendum 3 hereto
(R. 635-640)
On August 23, 2002, Plaintiff/Appellant moved the court for an order altering or
amending the judgment under Rule 59 (e). Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which was
denied by order of the lower court on October 7, 2002 (R. 629-631).
On September 2, 2002, Defendants/Appellants sought and obtained issuance of a
writ of garnishment to Zions First National Bank as garnishee, seeking garnishment of all
funds on deposit in any depositoiy accounts maintained by Plaintiff/Appellant. On
September 12, 2002, Zions First National Bank returned an amended response to the
garnishee interrogatories1, indicating that Plaintiff/Appellant maintained funds on deposit
in the amount of $37,585.00, and froze the same pending further order of the court - see
Addendum 4 (R. 700-705).
Plaintiff/Appellant requested a hearing on Defendants'/Appellees' writ of
garnishment on September 23, 2002, asserting that the funds on deposit in its Zions Bank
account were being held for payment of subcontractors on a separate project, and
therefore exempt from garnishment. The matter was called on for hearing before the trial
court on October 7, 2002 (R. 726). Plaintiff/Appellant presented no evidence to
contradict the answers of Zions First National Bank to Defendants'/Appellees' garnishee

1

594240vl

In a prior response, Zions had inadvertently garnished Defendants' account.
-5-

14580 0001

interrogatories; accordingly, at the conclusion of argument, the court ruled that Plaintiffs
objections to the writ of garnishment were not well-taken.
'.! llinr In ill
o r c j e r 011 t j i e w r [ t 0 f

mill

ilium i linn I l'n li mliiul'i and AppelK v . f i l n l i piopoM il l i u n i

!

garnishment. On October 16, though, Plaintiff/Appellant moved for a

"new trial" on the writ of garnishment under Rule 59, I J tail Rules of Civil Procedure
< •

lie Motion was accompanied by tlie A ffida ^ it of Joh 111 'ochynok, owner

not been offered or introduced into evidence at the October 7 hearing (R. 766-76^;. i lie
com l denied Plaintiff/Appellant's Rule 59 motion (R. 849-851), and no appeal is taken
therefrom t,^\

.. -iu v. . . . \,,;*.;:. R 816 81 "/ )

o\ ei i i iliiif Plaintiff/A

'

\ i i il ing issued Octobe i 1 5 , 2002 ,

>b jections to the w i it and ordering funds released to

Defendants/Appellees. See Addendum 5 hereto (R.776-779).
Plaintiff/Appellant filed its Notice cf Appcil o^ Vovembu 4, ^v.1
•• '

•

On

!

d

be required for this appeal (R. 852-853).
STATEMENT O F FACTS
Most of the salient i acts i elev ai it to this appeal arise i lot fron I the underlying
dispi itc; (resoh eel b;; a jm n j \ ei diet ft. oi it i \ 1 licl 11 LO appeal is taken).,, but from post-trial
proceedings which are fully described in the foregoing Statement of the Case. The
following Statement of Facts briefly sets out additional inforn lat'ion relevant to the
argument \

594240vl

6

14580.0001

1.

By this action, Plaintiff and Appellant J. Pochynok Company, Inc. sought

an order of the Court foreclosing a mechanic's lien interest in property located at 7100
Canyon Road in Summit County, Slate of Utah, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1, et
seq. See Plaintiffs Amended Lien Foreclosure Complaint herein (R. 200-208).
2.

Plaintiffs claims were based upon a Notice of Mechanic's Lien filed with

the Summit County Recorder's office on October 19, 1999, in the amount of $74,360.51,
together with interest, $100 in costs and attorneys' fees (R, 208-402).
3.

Plaintiff had previously filed, and then released, a Notice of Mechanic's

Lien against Defendants' property on July 26, 1999 in the amount of $150,000, plus
interest, costs and attorneys' fees (R. 405).
4.

Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim asserted, inter alia, defective

workmanship and delay damages. See Defendants' Answer to Plaintiffs Amended Lien
Foreclosure Complaint and Counterclaim herein (R. 19-29; 211-218).
5.

This matter was set for trial to a jury commencing May 21, 2002.

6.

On May 9, 2002, Defendants submitted to Plaintiff, through its counsel, an

offer of judgment in the amount of $40,000, tendered pursuant to Utah Code Ami. § 38-118(3). See Addendum 1 hereto (R. 408-410).

594240vl

7.

Plaintiff never accepted Defendants' May 9, 2002 offer of judgment.

8.

This matter was tried to a jury on May 21 and 22, 2002.
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9.

At trial, Plaintiff asserted a claim against Defendants in the amount of

$81,269.91 (exclusive of costs and attorneys' fees). See Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 26 (R.
412-431).
10.

During trial, Defendants presented evidence that they were entitled to

significant offsets for unearned supervisor fees, work defects and delays. Defendants
further produced evidence that they had never received a consistent accounting from
Plaintiff despite nearly three years of negotiations and attempts, contradictory and
inconsistent claims coming from Plaintiff right up to the eve of trial.
11.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury returned a general verdict in

favor of Plaintiff in the amount of only $7,076.56. See Addendum 2 hereto (R. 354-355).
12.

Prior to and through May 9, 2002, Defendants incurred $1,906.94 in costs

and $48,083.10 in attorneys' fees. Affidavit of Ross I. Romero (R. 435-459).
13.

Between May 10, 2002 and the entry of judgment, Defendants/Appellees

incurred $775.70 in costs and $33,280.00 in attorneys' fees. Affidavit of Ross I. Romero
(R. 435-459).
14.

Pursuant to writ of garnishment to Zions First National Bank as garnishee,

Defendants/Appellees recovered $37,585.00 from Plaintiff/Appellant's account. (R. 700705).
15.

In its sworn answers to garnishee interrogatories, Zions expressly

acknowledged that J. Pochynok was the company owner of the garnished account, and set
out the amount on deposit (R. 700-705).

594240vl
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16.

Contrary to the clear implication in paragraphs 11-17 of Appellant's

Statement of Facts (Appellant's brief at pp. 8-9), Plaintijf/Appellantpresented no
evidence whatsoever to the trial court at the October 7, 2002 hearing on
Defendants/Appellees' writ of garnishment to Zions First National Bank. As such, not
one of the facts set out in those paragraphs was established by testimony, by documents
or other physical evidence offered or received into evidence, or otherwise. Rather, they
were set out in an affidavit signed by John Pochynok, and filed with the trial court on
October 16, 2002 - nine days after the court had already granted Plaintiff/Appellant a
hearing on its objections to the writ of garnishment, and ruled against them, and over a
month after the return on the writ of garnishment was filed by the garnishee. (R. 766769)

PRIOR OR RELATED APPEALS
There are no prior or related appeals herein.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
1.

Utah Code Ann. §31-1-17:
Except as provided in § 38-11-107, as between the owner and
the contractor, the Court shall apportion the costs according
to the right of the case. . . .

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1):
Except as provided in § 38-11-107 and in subsection (2), in
any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter, the
successful party shall be entitled to recovery a reasonable
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the Court, which shall be taxed
as costs in the action.

594240vl
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3.

Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3):
A party against whom any action is brought to enforce a lien
under this chapter may make an offer of judgment pursuant to
Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If the offer is
not accepted and the judgment finally obtained by the offeree
is not more favorable that the offer, the offeree shall pay the
costs and attorneys' fees incurred by the offerer after the offer
was made.2

4.

Rule64D(h),U.R.C.P.:
The Defendant or any other person who owns or claims an
interest in the property subject to garnishment that is
garnisheed may request a hearing to claim any exemption to
the garnishment, or to challenge the issuance of the writ or the
accuracy of the answers to interrogatories. . .. The request
for a hearing shall be in the form to enable the defendant or
other person to specify the grounds upon which the defendant
or other person challenges the issuance of the writ or the
accuracy of the answers to interrogatories. . .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court properly awarded to Defendants and Appellees Smedsruds all
attorneys' fees and costs incurred after May 9, 2002, the date on which they made an
offer of judgment to Pochynok. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3) mandates an award of
attorneys' fees in all mechanic's lien cases where the claimant does not recover more than
an offer of judgment. As Pochynok's net recovery amounted to only a fraction of the
$40,000 offered it on May 9, 2002, application of the statute required an award of
Defendants'/ Appellees' post-May 9 attorneys' fees.

2

Rule 68, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, permits the extension of an offer of judgment at any time more
than 10 days prior to the commencement of trial.
594240vl
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Plaintiffs/Appellant's claim that the statute should be inapplicable, as it was
enacted after this case had been filed, ignores the remedial nature of the statute. Under
governing law, a substantive law may be applied only prospectively, whereas a remedial
law is applied retroactively. Case law from numerous jurisdictions has established
beyond contention that a legislative enactment providing an award of attorneys' fees is
remedial in nature, and may operate retrospectively. Moreover, the statute simply
clarifies the prior version of Utah Code. Ann. § 38-1-18 to specify a category of
"successful party" under that provision as previously enacted.
Defendants and Appellees, moreover, must be deemed the "successful parties," for
puiposes of Utah Code. Ann. §§ 38-1-17 and 38-1-18, and the lower court's awrard of all
costs and fees was not an abuse its discretion. Under the balancing test mandated by
Shupe v. Menlove, 18 Utah 2d 130, 417 P.2d 246 (1966), coupled with the "flexible,
reasoned approach" to detennining the "successful party," as mandated in the case lawhanded down since that time, Smedsruds were clearly the successful parties in this case.
They defeated all but a fraction of Pochynok's mechanic's lien claims through assertion
of rights of setoff. Given their statutory entitlement to post-May 9 attorneys' fees,
moreover, the net recovery in the case goes in favor of Defendants and Appellees, and
renders them the "successful parties" under any definition.
Finally, the lower court did not err in permitting garnishment of funds on deposit
in J. Pochynok Company's bank account with Zions First National Bank.
Plaintiff/Appellant J. Pochynok Company asserts that the funds were actually the

594240vl
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property of a third party, paid to J. Pochynok Company in connection with a separate
construction project. The argument suffers two failings, however. First,
Plaintiff/Appellant offered no evidence to support its contention in this regard when the
matter was heard on October 7, 2002. Far from carrying the required burden of proof by
"clear and convincing evidence" that the funds were not J. Pochynok Company's property
notwithstanding their deposit in its bank account with Zions, J. Pochynok Company
furnished not one scrap of evidence to support its position. Second, even the evidence
offered by affidavit after the hearing conclusively concluded established only that the
funds on deposit in the account had been paid to J. Pochynok Company in connection
with another construction project, pursuant to a contract with the owner/payer. At that
point, the funds became the property of Plaintiff?Appellant, to be paid to whichever
creditor it saw fit to pay (subject, however, to judicial process in the form of writs of
garnishment). The fact that Plaintiff/Appellant Pochynok would have preferred to pay
subcontiactors on another project, at Smedsruds' expense, does not alter its ownership of
the funds, or their susceptibility to garnishment by Defendants and Appellees.

594240vl
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED TO
DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES ALL ATTORNEYS' FEES
INCURRED AFTER MAY 9, 2002
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3) provides as follows:
A party against whom any action is brought to enforce a lien
under this chapter may make an offer of judgment pursuant to
Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If the offer is
not accepted and the judgment finally obtained by the offeree
is not more favorable that the offer, the offeree shall pay the
costs and attorneys' fees incurred by the offerer after the offer
was made.3
The language of 38-1-18(3) is mandatoiy. By making their offer of judgment of $40,000
on May 9, 2002, Defendants/Appellees became statutorily entitled to a recovery of all
costs and attorneys' fees incurred after that date if Plaintiff/Appellant, as lienholder,
failed to recover more than the amount of the offer at trial. It is undisputed that
Plaintiffs/Appellant's recovery, net of offsets asserted by Defendants/Appellees, was
only a fraction of the offer amount. Without more, then, Defendants and Appellees were
statutorily entitled to an award of costs in the amount of $775.70, and attorneys' fees in
the amount of $33,280.00.
Plaintiffs/Appellant's only response to this is that Section 38-1-18(3) was enacted
effective April, 2001-more than a year before Defendants and Appellees made their Offer

3

Rule 68, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, permits the extension of an offer of judgment at any time more
than 10 days prior to the commencement of trial.
594240vl
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of Judgment in this matter, but after the case had been filed. Plaintiff argues, without
authority, that Section 38-1-18(3) "plainly affects substantive or vested rights," and
therefore may not be applied to any portion of a lawsuit filed before its effective date.4
Defendants' Offer of Judgment was made pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, as was required by section 38-1-18. It was made pursuant to a
procedural rule and was therefore remedial in nature. Defendants, although not required,
clarified their offer by referencing section 38-1-18 to put Plaintiff on notice that they
would be seeking their attorneys' fees from the date of offer should plaintiffs fail to
collect at least the amount offered. In sum, there should be no question about the nature
of Defendants' offer being procedural.
Further, whether a statute is applied retroactively depends on the nature of the
enactment. The Utah Court of Appeals recently articulated the applicable standard in the
case of Wilde v. Wilde, 35 P.3d 341 (UT App 2001), cited in Appellant's brief:
"As a general rule, amendments which 'affect substantive or
invested rights . . . operate prospectively' [citing Department
of Social Service v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982)].
However, if an amendment is procedural or remedial, then it
applies to accrued, pending and future actions. See Id. . . . 'A
substantive law creates, defines and regulates the rights and
duties of the parties which may give rise to a cause of action."
[quoting Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438 (UT App 1998)] . . . A
procedural or remedial law cprovid[es] a different mode or
form of procedure for enforcing substantive rights,' [citation

4

Plaintiff/Appellant cites to the cases of Wilde v. Wilde, 35 P.3d 341 (UT App 2001) mdJohansen v.
Johansen, 2002 Ut. App. 75 (UT App 2002), both of which concern statutory modifications of alimony rights.
Alimony is clearly a vested, substantive right which may not be disturbed through retroactive legislation. For those
reasons set out herein, though, an award of attorneys' fees incurred in litigation is a procedural device, not a
substantive right. See also discussion of the Wilde decision, infra.
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omitted], or clarifies the meaning of an earlier enactment,
[citation omitted]" 35 P.3d at page 344-345,
See also State Department of Human Services v. Jacoby, 975 P.2d 939 (UT App 1999)
(holding that an enactment extending the applicable statute of limitations was procedural,
and applied retroactively); Moore v. American Coal Company, 111 P.2d 989 (Utah 1987)
(holding that a post-filing legislative enactment making hearing on a workmen's
compensation claim discretionary with the administrative law judge defeated no
substantive right, but was procedural and therefore retroactive).
For the reasons set out below, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3) is clearly remedial
and procedural, and applicable to the Offer of Judgment made in this action 13 months
after its enactment.
A,

Statutory Enactments Granting Attorneys' Fees Have Been Expressly
Held Procedural and Remedial, and Applied Retroactively to Pending
Litigation,

Although no Utah court has ruled directly on the question, other jurisdictions have
expressly held that the statute granting a right to attorneys' fees is procedure and remedial
in nature, and therefore applicable retroactively to cases pending on its effective date.
In the case of Veloedman v. Cornell, 161 Or. App. 396, 984 P.2d 906 (Or. Ct.
App. 1999), the court retroactively applied a statute authorizing awards of attorneys' fees
to prevailing parties in actions for injuries to crops. The court began by observing that
neither the statute itself nor its legislative history, stated whether or not it was to be given
retroactively application. The court then stated the following:
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The pertinent maximum of construction is that, in the absence
of evidence of what the legislature actually intended, we
presume that it intended retroactive effect to be given to
statutes that are "remedial" or "procedural," as opposed to
"substantive" in nature [citation omitted]. In this case, two
factors lead us to conclude that OR.S 105.810(2) is remedial
or procedural and, thus, retroactive.
First, we observe the essentially remedial nature of the statute
as a whole. The Supreme Court has explained that, at least in
the context of determining the retroactivity of statutes,
"remedial" statutes are those "which pertain to or affect a
remedy, as distinguished from those which affect or modify a
substantive right or duty."[citation omitted] OR.S 105.810 is
such a statute. It provides property owners a statutory remedy
for the unlawful taking of crops, a remedy that includes treble
damages and, since 1995, attorneys' fees. The attorneys' fees
provision was added to the statute without altering any
underlying legal duties.
Second, we observe that OR.S 105.810(2) provides for an
award of attorneys' fees as "reimbursement of reasonable
costs of litigation." The distinction between attorneys' fees
as costs and attorneys' fees as a consequence of substantive
liability has proven critical in prior cases."
984 P.2d at pages 908-909.
Similarly, in the case oiMcCormack v. Town of Granite, 913 P.2d 282 (Okl.
1996), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated that "statutes relating to the award of
attorney fees to a prevailing party are procedural, and subject to retrospective operation."
(913 P.2d at page 285). See also Quails v. Farmers Insurance Company, Inc., 629 P.2d
1258 (Okl. 1981) ("The general rule that the statutes will be given prospective operation
only . . . does not apply to statutes affecting procedure. .. .Taxing of attorneys' fees as
costs relates to a motive procedure.").
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Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3) clearly falls within the holding of the foregoing
authorities. Enacted in 2001, it modified the language of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18
(initially enacted well before this action was filed, which provided for attorneys' fees to
be "taxed as costs in the action" to the "successful party") (see POINT II below). As
enacted, subsection (3) did not enlarge, contract, modify or otherwise affect any
contractual or other substantive right held by J. Pochynok Company, Inc. at the time this
action began. It neither created nor revoked any substantive right giving rise to any civil
cause of action.5
By definition, in fact, Section 38-1-18(3) has nothing to do with the substantive
rights and obligations giving rise to the parties" claims in the litigation. It cannot be
invoked until the case is already pending. By its express terms, however, the Offer of
Judgment contemplated by the statute may, under Rule 68, be made at any time up to ten
days prior to trial.
On its face, the statute is a procedural device for mitigating the impact of
attorneys' fee awards on minuscule recoveries by over-reaching contractors. It is a
procedural, cost-shifting devise, and nothing more. Based on the clear weight of
authority, it should be treated as remedial and procedural, rather than substantive, and
given retroactive application to this case.

5

By definition, awards of attorneys' fees are not "damages" under law-see Rodwater v. Old Republic
Surety, 854 P.2d 527 (Utah 1993); Collier v. Heinz, 827 P.2d 982 (UT App 1992).
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B.

Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3) Clarifies the Prior
Enactment.

Prior to April 1, 2001, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 stated the following:
Except as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-1076, as
between the owner and the contractor the court shall
apportion the costs according to the right of the case, but in
any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the
successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed
as costs in the action.
By adding subsection (3) in 2001, the legislature further illuminated its intent as to
who was the "successful party" under § 38-1-18 as previously enacted. Should the
property owner make an Offer of Judgment for more than the contractor's ultimate
recovery of trial, the legislature clearly concluded, the property owner - not the
contractor-should be deemed the "successful party" under § 38-1-18 with respect to costs
and attorneys' fees incurred after the offer was made.
In other words, subsection (3) simply defined, directed and clarified the
application of § 38-1-18 in situations where an Offer of Judgment had been made-an area
clearly within the court's discretion prior to 2001, as addressed at POINT II, below. As
such, the 2001 enactment should be given retroactive application to a case pending prior
to its effective date, particularly when the Offer of Judgment was made well after that
time.

6

The reference section concerned mechanic's lien claims on residential properties by subcontractors
which is not applicable in the present case.
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C.

Had Plaintiff Accepted Defendants' Offer Of Judgment Thev Would
Have Been Bound By It

In arguing that § 38-1-18(3) should have only prospective application, J. Pochynok
Company ignores a fundamental inequity. Had J. Pochynok Company accepted
Defendants'/Appellees' May 9, 2002 Offer of Judgment in this matter, it would have
been statutorily entitled to entry of judgment thereon under Rule 68, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Defendants would have had no means of avoiding entry of judgment thereon
by claiming that § 38-1-18(3) should be afforded only prospective application. Having
elected to decline the offer, PlaintifffAppellant should not be pennitted to make the same
self argument in his own interests.
With regard, finally, to J. Pochynok Company's observation that the attorneys'
fees which it incurred in trial should be added to the amount of the verdict in determining
whether or not its recovery exceeded the amount of the offer, the response is simple:
J. Pochynok Company recovered no fees, at trial or thereafter. The judgment entered in
this matter cannot be massaged in any way that makes it "more favorable than the offer";
accordingly, J. Pochynok Company's argument based on what might have happened, or
even what should have happened, is moot.
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POINT II
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING
TO DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES THEIR COSTS
AND ATTORNEYS' FEES INCURRED PRIOR TO
MAY 9, 2002.
Actions brought (or defended) under Utah's Mechanic's Liens Statute fall within a
statutory exception to the general rule that, in civil litigation matters, the parties each bear
their respective costs and attorneys' fees. Utah's Mechanic's Lien Act calls for an award
of costs and attorneys' fees to the "successful party" in a lien foreclosure action.
The Utah Supreme Court has expressly held that the term "successful party" for
purposes of award costs and attorneys' fees, must be viewed in light of two separate
statutory provisions, which have been interpreted to complement each other. Utah Code
Ann. § 38-1-18(1) provides as follows:
Except as provided in § 38-11-107 and in subsection (2), in
any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter, the
successful party shall be entitled to recovery a reasonable
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the Court, which shall be taxed
as costs in the action.
Utah Code Ann. § 31-1-17, however, reads as follows:
Except as provided in § 38-11-107, as between the owner and
the contractor, the Court shall apportion the costs according
to the right of the case. . . .
In the early case of Shape v. Menlove, 18 Utah 2d 130, 417 P.2d 246 (1966), the Utah
Supreme Court was faced with a case in which (precisely as in the case before the Court
in this action) a building contractor sought to foreclose a mechanic's lien claim against a
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propeity owner pursuant to a cost-plus-ten-percent building contract. There, as here, the
jury had returned a verdict in favor of the contractor, but for substantially less than the
amount of the contractor's mechanic's lien claim or the amount asserted at trial. The trial
Court rejected the contractor's claim that he had been the "successful party" at trial and
the Utah Supreme Court affirmed. In its opinion, the Court quoted the language of § 17
and 18 of the Mechanic's Lien Statute set out above, and then stated the following:
It is plain that these two sections relating to this subject
should be construed together and that when attorney fees are
awardable thereunder, they are to be treated as costs, which,
as expressed in 38-1-17 the Court 'shall apportion the cost
according to the right of the case.'
417P.2dat249.
More recent cases are in accord. J. Pochynok Company cites the Court to its
decision iwAK&R Whipple Plumbing & Healing v. Guy, 47 P.3d 92 (UT App 2002) for
the proposition that a "successful party" in a mechanic's lien action must be determined
by a mechanical, winner-take-all, net-recovery rule. Contrary to Plaintiffs/Appellant's
argument, though, the Whipple decision stands for the proposition that a trial court's
determination of who is the "successful (or prevailing) party" is not a mechanical process
at all (unless all claims run one way only); that, where claims in a civil action run both
ways and both parties are to a degree successful, the court must adopt "a flexible and
reasoned approach", taking into consideration the practical and substantive outcome of
the litigation. In fact, the court's opinion, while determining that "successful party" and
"prevailing party" were synonymous terms, expressly noted that:
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we do not suggest that whether a claim is ultimately
determined to be enforceable under the conditions of Section
38-1-18 is not a factor to be considered in determining which
party or parties prevail or are successful.
(47 P.3d at 95.) The court's language here has specific application to this case, where
Smedsruds offered judgment for nearly six times Plaintiffs ultimate recovery, and thus
became entitled as a matter of law to all attorneys' fees incurred after May 9, 2002 (the
sum total of which far eclipsed Plaintiff s jury verdict). While Whipple rejected the stiict
"net recovery" rule in cases where (as here), both parties realize on claims, Smedsruds'
statutory entitlement to post-May 9 attorneys' fees clearly dictates a net balance in their
favor. Certainly, under the "flexible and reasoned approach" mandated by Whipple, the
court's decision in this case is unassailable.
The Whipple decision, moreover, expressly invoked and affirmed the Court of
Appeals' decision in Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Savings Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217 (Ut.
Ct. App. 1990), the holding which expressly validates the Court's ruling in this action.
In Occidental the plaintiff brought a trust deed deficiency action against the Defendant,
seeking also an award of costs and attorneys' fees (in that case under Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-1-32). The trial court observed that, of its six-figure deficiency claim, the plaintiff
recovered only $7,339.44. Based thereon, the trial court determined that, even though
plaintiff obtained a judgment against Defendants, they were the "prevailing parties" by
reason of the nominal amount thereof, and awarded them costs and attorneys' fees. The
court of appeals affirmed:
At trial, Occidental obtained a judgment of approximately
$7300. It argues that a money judgment in its favor entitles it
to attorneys' fees as the prevailing party. As stated above,
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this court has recognized the needfor a flexible and reasoned
approach to making determinations of who is the prevailing
party.
In the case at hand, Occidental claimed a balance due of over
$600,000 resulting from the trustee's sale held in April 1986
. . . The Mehrs were successful in defending against
Occidental's claim for a $600,000 deficiency based on the
April sale. The Mehrs successfully demonstrated the validity
of the December sale, thus the deficiency judgment was for
the stipulated amount of $7339.44. In light of the
circumstances involved and the issues contested at trial, the
trial court did not err in granting the Melirs attorneys' fees
and costs as the prevailing party.
791 P. 2d at 222. In Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Savings, then, as in the instant case, the
trial court sustained an award of attorneys' fees to a party which successfully defeated all
but a token amount of the opposing party's claim. Occidental directly defeats the claim
of Plaintiff in this action to the effect that any award of a money judgment automatically
entitles the recipient to the status of "prevailing party," and to an award of attorneys' fees
as a matter of law. Rather, the Court must look to the realities of the case, and adopt the
Court of Appeals' "flexible and reasoned approach" to an av/ard of attorneys' fees.
Under the Occidental/Nebraska decision, as affirmed in Whipple, the Court's ruling in
this action should stand.
Finally, the "flexible and reasoned approach" dictated by Occidental and Whipple
was affirmed and expanded in the recent Utah Supreme Court decision of R.T. Nielson
Company v. Cook 2002 UT 11, 2002 Utah LEXIS 16 (Utah 2002):
As the court of appeals noted in Mountain States
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, determining the prevailing party
for puiposes of awarding fees can often times be quite simple.
783 P.2d 551, 555 (Ut. 1989). Where a plaintiff sues for
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money damages, and plaintiff wins, plaintiff is the prevailing
party; if defendant successfully defends and avoids adverse
judgment, defendant has prevailed. Id. This simple analysis
cannot always be employed, however...
Which party is the prevailing party is an appropriate question
for the trial court. This question depends, to a large measure,
on the context of each case, and, therefore, it is appropriate to
leave this determination to the sound discretion of the trial
court. We therefore review the trial court's determination as to
who was the prevailing party under an abuse of discretion
standard. Appropriate considerations for the trial court would
include, but are not limited to, (1) contractual language, (2)
the number of claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, etc.,
brought by the parties, (3) the importance of the claims
relative to each other and their significance in the context of
the lawsuit considered as a whole, and (4) the dollar amounts
attached to and awarded in connection with the various
claims. Based on these and other relevant factors, the trial
court is in a better position than we are as an appellate court
to decide which party is the prevailing party. In most cases
involving language similar to the contractual language before
us here, there can generally be only one prevailing party.
[Citations omitted.] However, the standard articulated above
will permit a case-by-case evaluation by the trial court, and
flexibility to handle circumstances where both, or neither,
parties may be considered to have prevailed.
2002 Utah Lexis at 25.
In this action, the "right of the case" plainly dictated that Defendants and
Appellees Gregoiy and Louann Smedsmd be deemed the "successful parties" for
purposes of an award of costs and attorneys' fees, and the trial court so found. Under the
R.T. Nielson standard, as well as that in Occidental and Whipple, the trial court's
determination was clearly the correct outcome, and should not be disturbed.
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A.

Defendants Defeated Virtually All of Plaintiffs Mechanic's Lien Claim.

To begin with, while Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff realized a nominal
recovery on this mechanics lien claim, the award amounted to less than 10% of his
original mechanics lien claim, and barely 8% of his asserted amount at trial. The jury, as
trier of fact, was clearly persuaded that Plaintiffs claim was not only excessive, but
should be all but eclipsed by Defendants9 claimed offsets.
It was Plaintiffs inability, and unwillingness, to furnish a consistent accounting on
the pioject which necessitated adjudication of this matter to begin with. Defendants tried
repeatedly, both before and after completion of the project, to persuade Mr. Pochynok to
sit down with them and resolve the account. Rather than do so, Plaintiff simply made
repeated demands for payment, the amount of the demand changing each time (often
several times in the course of only a few days). Not only were the numbers inconsistent,
but none would acknowledge a single penny of offset for improper work or delays.
Any practical application of the principals set out in the decision of Shupe v.
Menlove, dictates that, apportioning costs and attorneys' fees between owners and
contract "according to the right of the case" dictates that Smedsruds - not J. Pochynok
Company - were the "successful party," and should be awarded their costs and attorneys'
fees.
B.

Defendants' Statutory Right to Attorneys' Fees After May 9, 2002
Results in a Net Recovery in Their Favor,

Even to the extent the jury's verdict was nominally in Plaintiffs favor, the effect
of that verdict is more than offset by Defendants' right to post-May 9 attorneys' fees as
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set out under Point I, above. Under such circumstances, Defendants/Apellees must be
deemed the successful litigants in this matter, and their attorneys' fees before May 9,
2002 likewise awarded. Attorneys' fees under the Mechanics Lien Act are to be awarded
to the party or parties which are "ultimately successful" - see Calcium v. Systems
Communications Corp,, 939 P. 2d 185 (UT App 1997).7
C.

The Jury's Verdict Necessarily Implied the Filing of Two Wrongful
Liens by Plaintiff.

As noted above, J. Pochynok Company filed two successive liens against
Defendants'/Appellees' property in connection with its claims in this matter. The first,
for $150,000, was released not long after its filing; the second, for some $74,000,
remained pending through trial.
Yet the jury's verdict - clearly applying Defendants' offset claims - was for just
over $7,000 total. The conclusion is inescapable that both notices of lien were for
amounts far in excess of that which J. Pochynok Company was ultimately entitled. The
conclusion was likewise inescapable that the puipose of the liens' filing was to secure
payment to Plaintiff for an amount greater than that actually owing.

7

Appellees recognize that J. Pochynok Company attempts to make this selfsame argument in an effort to
defeat their May 9 Offer of Judgment (Appellant's Brief at p. 14). The difference, though, is fundamental:
Defendants and Appellees were awarded their costs and fees after May 9. The trial court, in otlier words, reviewed
the issues in their correct order. It looked first to the amount of the verdict, and determined it to be not "more
favorable than the offer", thus mandating an award of fees after the date of the offer. With those fees included,
Defendants and Appellees clearly became the "successful parties" under the earlier statute. Plaintiff's/Appellant's
approach would have this Court turn such analysis on its head, revoking fees which the trial court did award,
granting fees which it did not award, and reconstructing the balance of success in disregard of determinations by
both the trial judge and the jury.
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Under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25, the filing of an excessive lien under the
circumstances set out above constitutes a misdemeanor.8 It is self-evident that? in taxing
costs (including attorneys' fees) "according to the right of the case," as mandated by Utah
Code Ann. § 38-1-17 and Shape v. Menlove, the Court took into account the fact that the
mechanics lien which Plaintiff sought to vindicate by this action (as well as its
predecessor) were shown at trial to be excessive, wrongful and illegal on their face.
Under such circumstances, Defendants and Appellees were properly awarded their
attorneys' fees as the "successful parties"
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REJECTING
PLAINTIFF'S/APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS TO
DEFENDANTS7APPELLEES' WRIT OF
GARNISHMENT TO ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK
J. Pochynok Company's most mystifying claim on appeal is that the lower court
committed reversible error in permitting Defendants and Appellees to garnish, from
J. Pochynok Company's own bank account at Zions First National Bank, funds
admittedly on deposit there at the time the writ of garnishment was served. J. Pochynok
Company claims that these funds were not really its property; that they were being held

8

Since this action wasfiled,Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25 has been amended to permit a right of civil
recovery for wrongful lien filing. In addition, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(2) has been added since the filing of this
action, statutorily denying to a mechanic's lien claimant the right to recover any attorneys' fees whatever in the
event that its lien filing is adjudged wrongful. While these provisions were not in effect at the time Plaintiffs
notices of mechanic's liens werefiledin this action, they plainly codified what was already clear in the law - that
the pursuit of excessive mechanic's liens is contrary to public policy.
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"in trust" for subcontractors on another job. This argument, however, suffers to fatal
defects, one procedural and the other substantive.
A.

J. Pochynok Company presented no evidence to the trial court to
support any challenge to the writ of garnishment.

As noted above, J. Pochynok Company filed a request for hearing on
September 23, 2002 with respect to the writ of garnishment returned by Zions First
National Bank on September 12, 2002.9 The procedure thus invoked is set out at Rule
64D(h), U.R.C.P., which reads in pertinent part as follows:
The Defendant or any other person who owns or claims an
interest in the property subject to garnishment that is
garnisheed may request a hearing to claim any exemption to
the garnishment, or to challenge the issuance of the writ or the
accuracy of the answers to interrogatories. . . . The request
for a hearing shall be in the form to enable the defendant or
other person to specify the grounds upon which the defendant
or other person challenges the issuance of the writ or the
accuracy of the answers to interrogatories. . .
J. Pochynok Company's request for hearing (R. 724-725) requests a hearing to
claim an exemption to the Zions' writ of garnishment, but states only that "the basis for
the exemption is that the funds in J. Pochynok Company, Inc.'s account are owned by
other persons or entities" (R. 724-725). The court accordingly scheduled a hearing for

9

The court's disposition of Pochynok's objections to the writ of garnishment, held, inter alia, that the
request for hearing had been untimelyfiled,being more than ten days after the return on the writ of garnishment.
This was due to a misstatement by Defendants/Appellee's counsel at the hearing, given that the tenth day fell on
Sunday, September 22, 2002. Given the other failings in Pochynok's proof, and the substance of his objections, the
error was harmless. Moreover, this issue was disposed of pursuant to Pochynok's Rule 59 U.R.C.P. motion, from
which no appeal is taken.
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October 7, 2002. No further submittals, statements, documents or claims were
forthcoming from Pochynok before the hearing
At the hearing (of which this court has no transcript due to Pochynok's election
not to rely on such transcript), J. Pochynok Company presented no evidence whatsoever
in support of its request for hearing. The court accordingly determined that, based upon
Zions' answers to garnishee inteixogatories, the funds in the garnisheed account belonged
to J. Pochynok Company, and were subject to Defendants/Appellees' judgment claim (R
776-779). The court's ruling in this regard was in full accord with the requirements of
Rule 64D(h)(3)(i):
If the court determines at the hearing . . that the assets or a
portion thereof are subject to garnishment and not exempt, it
shall issue an order to pay the Property Subject to
Garnishment directly to plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney or as
otherwise ordered by the court. . .
Only after the date and time of the scheduled hearing, and pursuant to a Rule 59,
U.R.C.P. motion for new trial, did J. Pochynok Company attempt to offer actual
evidence, in the form of the affidavit of John Pochynok, to the effect that the funds in its
bank account belonged to someone else. No explanation was given as to why this
evidence could not have been offered at the October 7 hearing. The trial court denied the
motion for new trial, and J. Pochynok Company did not appeal therefrom.
It is incumbent upon any party challenging the ownership of funds in a depository
account to establish, by clear and convincing evidence that the funds are not the property
of the account owner - Peterson v. Peterson, 571 P.2d 1360 (1977); Beehive State Bankv.
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Rosqitisu 21 Utah 2d 17, 439 P.2d 468 (1968). In this case, far from establishing
ownership of the garnisheed funds in a third party by "clear and convincing evidence",
J. Pochynok Company failed to offer any evidence at the hearing whatever, seeking to
rely upon an affidavit filed nine days after the hearing concluded, containing testimony
never before presented to the Court.10 Plaintiff having failed to carry its burden of proof,
the only competent evidence before the Court on October 7, 2002 consisted of the sworn
answers to garnishment interrogatories of Zions First National Bank, which
acknowledged that the bank was indebted to J. Pochynok Company, Inc. in the amount of
$37,585.00, the amount maintained in Plaintiffs checking account with Zions. With no
competent evidence before it to refute Zions' position, the Court properly found the funds
subject to garnishment, and its ruling was clearly sustained by the evidence.
B.

Even If the Testimony of John Pochynok's Affidavit Had Been
Presented at the Hearing, it Would Not Have Sustained Plaintiffs
Burden of Proof

Even assuming that John Pochynok had taken the stand on October 7 and testified
in accordance with his October 16, 2002 affidavit, moreover, it would not have
established, by clear and convincing evidence, that the funds in Plaintiffs bank account
were not subject to the garnishment by the Smedsruds. By Mr. Pochynok's own

10

Plaintiffs attempt to offer an affidavit in support of its motion for a new trial, containing evidence
which was not presented at trial, invokes not the "insufficient evidence" basis of Rule 59(a)(6), but the "newly
discovered evidence" basis of Rule 59(a)(4). Plaintiffs decision not to rely on this provision of the Rule, however,
is understandable - the requirement is that the evidence be such as the movant "could not, with reasonable
diligence, had discovered and produced at the trial". Plaintiff makes no suggestion that the content of Mr.
Pochynok's October 16, 2002 affidavit could not have been presented to the Court at the hearing through the
testimony of Mr. Pochynok himself (who was present in court).
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admission, Plaintiff/Appellant received funds on deposit in its bank account as of
September 13, 2002 in its capacity as general contractor on a construction project for
Steve Young, the project owner (R. 766-769). As such, Plaintiff does not, and cannot
allege that Mr. Young was indebted to the subcontractors on the project; rather, Mr.
Young's obligation was to J. Pochynok Company as general contractor. This is
established by the invoice attached as Exhibit B to Pochynok's memorandum in support
of its Motion for New Trial (incorporated by reference in paragraph 4 of Mr, Pochynok's
affidavit, R. 766-769) - it is an invoice from J. Pochynok Company as general contractor
to Steve Young as owner, merely itemizing payments which J. Pochynok Company - not
Steve Young - must make to its subcontractors. By Mr. Pochynok's own admission,
Mr. Young paid the invoice by wire transfer into the garnished account.
It is noteworthy, in this connection, that Plaintiff has nowhere produced an
affidavit or other challenge from Mr. Young or any subcontractor claiming that they were
the owners of the garnished funds. The reason is obvious - Mr. Young performed under
his building contract with J. Pochynok Company, Inc. by paying the invoice, and
transferring funds to J. Pochynok Company, Inc. as general contractor. Were the
garnished funds actually the property of Mr. Young, and not Plaintiff, Mr. Young - not
Plaintiff- needed to appear before the trial court objecting to the garnishment. He was
conspicuous by his absence, as were any other alleged owners of the funds.
The situation in this case is easily distinguishable from that in Peterson v.
Peterson, 571 P. 2d 1360 (Utah 1977) - it does not involve joint de facto owners of a

594240vl

-31-

14580 0001

bank account, as was the case in that decision. Mr. Young paid the funds to J, Pochynok
Company, as he was contractually obligated to do. The funds, once in the account, were
J. Pochynok Company's alone, to do with as it pleased, but subject to competing
obligations, including the judgment in favor of Defendants and Appellees.
J. Pochynok Company seeks to invoke Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-603 in support of
the proposition that the funds in his bank account were not subject to garnishment by
Defendants and Appellees. The statute provides nothing of the sort. It merely provides
that, when a general contractor receives construction funds from an owner, it must pay
subcontractors and material men in proportion to the amount of work which they have
performed on the project. It does not deprive the general contractor of ownership of
funds paid by the owner.
Simply put, Plaintiff/Appellant J. Pochynok Company received a progress payment
on a project, but Defendants and Appellees garnished those funds before J. Pochynok
Company made payments to its subcontractors. The most that Plaintiff/Appellant can
make out of this situation is that it would rather have used funds from the project to pay
subcontractors to the exclusion of Smedsruds. Where a Writ of Garnishment is used in
aid of a valid judgment, however, the judgment debtor does not retain the option of
preferring other creditors over the judgment creditor.
CONCLUSION
Simply put, Plaintiff and Appellant J. Pochynok Company, Inc. lost at trial It lost
in any meaningful and practical sense. Defendants'/Appellees' set offs and counterclaims
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whittled a claim of over $81,000.00 down to less than $7,100.00 Moreover, J. Pochynok
Company had in hand an offer of $40,000.00 on May 9, 2002 - which, by statute, it
could reject only with the express understanding that, if this verdict was not larger than
that amount, it would be responsible for the attorneys' fees of Defendants and Appellees
incurred after that date. Plaintiff'Appellant elected to accept this risk. The result simply
cannot support a claim that Pochynok Co. wras the "successful party" in this litigation.
After the trial, when Defendants and Appellees Smedsruds had the good fortune to
garnish J. Pochynok Company's bank account after it had received payment from an
owner, but before it had drained the account with payments to other creditors,
Plaintiff/Appellant demanded a hearing on the writ of garnishment. However, it did not
avail itself of the opportunity before the Court, presenting no evidence to support its
claim that the money deposited by it in its own account did not belong to it. Even after
the hearing was over, and the Court had ruled against it, Plaintiff/Appellant failed to
establish any more than that a creditor had seized funds from his bank account before it
had the opportunity to pay those funds to other creditors.
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The lower Court ruled properly and prudently on all matters before it. Its rulings
should be affirmed without exception.
DATED this J

' '-

day of May, 2003.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH,P.C.

By.
Vincent C. Rampton
Ross I. Romero
Attorneys for Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud

594240vl

-34-

14580.0001

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ? ' •

day of May, 2003,1 caused to be mailed by

first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEES to the following:

Ray G. Martineau
Anthony R. Martineau
Brett D. Cragun
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

//
//

I
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Tabl

VINCENT C. RAMPTON (USB #2684)
ROSS I. ROMERO (USB #7771)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444
Telephone: (801)521-3200
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a
Corporation
Plaintiffs),

OFFER OF JUDGMENT
:

:
vs.
:
:
GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN
:
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFIELD LUMBER,
:
INC., a Corporation; PELLA PRODUCTS,
:
INC., a Corporation; BLAZE WHARTON
:
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Corporation;
:
DIXIE WOODWORKS, INC., a Corporation; :
and JEFREY KAISER, doing business as RIO :
GRANDE PAINTING,
:

Civil No. 0006000014
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendant(s).

TO:

PLAINTIFF AND COUNTERCLAIM DEFENDANT J. POCHYNOK COMPANY,
INC. AND COUNSEL
Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah Code Ann. §38-1-

18(3), defendants and counterclaim plaintiffs, Greg and LouAnn Smedsrud, offer to allow

5?"'654\ I

judgment to be taken against them in the sum of Forty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents
($40,000.00) in complete and final settlement of all claims by the plaintiff and counterclaim
defendant against defendants and counterclaim plaintiffs, Greg and LouAnn Smedsrud. If
plaintiff and counterclaim defendant do not accept this offer and fail to obtain a judgment at trial
against defendants and counterclaim plaintiffs which is more favorable than this offer, defendants
and counterclaim plaintiffs will seek reimbursement from the plaintiff and counterclaim
defendant of all attorneys' fees and costs incurred after making this offer pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §38-1-18(3). Evidence of this offer is inadmissible except in a proceeding to determine to
attorneys' fees and costs. This offer includes all claims, interest, liens, court costs and attorneys'
fees whatsoever that plaintiff and counterclaim defendant has made or could against defendants
and counterclaim plaintiffs. This offer is in lieu of and revokes all prior offers of settlement.

DATED this f ^

day of May, 2002.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
McDONOUGH

Vincent C. Rampton
Ross I. Romero
Attorneys for Gregory and LouAnn
Smedsrud
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Offer of
Judgment was sent via facsimile and hand delivery, to the following this

9^-

day of May,

2002:
Ray G. Martineau
Anthony R. Martineau
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

Y*~7^z- i*is
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a
Corporation,
Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant,

JURY VERDICT

02. o40\3Z$
vs.

Civil No. 0Q0600Q014-

GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFIELD LUMBER,
INC., a Corporation; PELLA PRODUCTS,
INC., a Corporation; BLAZE WHARTON
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Corporation;
DIXIE WOODWORKS, INC., a Corporation;
and JEFREY KAISER, doing business as RIO
GRANDE PAINTING,

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants and Counterclaim
Plaintiffs.
We, the jury, duly empaneled in the above-entitled matter, hold as follows in the aboveentitled action:
538370vl

1.

Based on the law as it has been explained to us, we find in favor of plaintiff J.

Pochynok Company, Inc., and against defendants Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud, in the amount

of$ ^f-OlGSU
2.

Based on the law as it has been explained to us, we find in favor of defendants

Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud, and against plaintiffs J. Pochynok Company, Inc., in the
amount of $
DATED this
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day of May, 2002.
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Tab 3

IMAGED

"Iff© Ms&ttittAK,

AUG 13
VINCENT C. RAMPTON (USB #2684)
ROSS I. ROMERO (USB #7771)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a
Corporation,
Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant,

ENTERED !M RZCISTRY
OF JUDGMENTS
DATE

JUDGMENT UPON VERDICT AND
ORDER ON POST TRIAL MOTIONS

vs.
GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFIELD LUMBER,
INC., a Corporation; PELLA PRODUCTS,
INC., a Corporation; BLAZE WHARTON
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Corporation;
DIXIE WOODWORKS, INC., a Corporation;
and JEFREY KAISER, doing business as RIO
GRANDE PAINTING,

ozoqo&zi
civil No. wmmmr
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants and Counterclaim
Plaintiffs.
This matter was tried to a jury on May 21 and 22, 2002. Prior to trial, all crossclaims
between defendants Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud and Pella Products, Inc. had been dismissed
with prejudice pursuant to stipulation and prior order of this Court. In addition, all claims of
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plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc. against defendants Blaze Wharton Construction, Inc. and
Jeffrey Kaiser were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure prior to trial.
On May 22, 2002, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff J. Pochynok Company,
Inc. and against Gregory Smedsrud and LouAnn Smedsrud, in the amount of $7,076.56. The jury
returned no verdict in favor of any other party hereto.
Following trial, both parties submitted motions for award of costs and attorneys fees
incurred in the action. In addition, the plaintiff submitted a motion for injunctive relief, asking
that this Court enjoin defendants from asserting claims or initiating legal proceedings against
Wynn G. Yelland, Paul V. Nesseth and Locus Architecture, Ltd., by reason of Mr. Yelland
having agreed to appear and testify at trial herein.
The Court having reviewed the parties' post-trial motions and supporting submittals,
being fully advised, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, adjudged and decreed as follows:
1.

The motion of Defendants Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud to tax costs and

attorneys fees is granted for those reasons set out in defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support
of Motion to Tax Costs and Attorneys Fees, and their Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Tax Costs and Attorneys Fees.
2.

Plaintiffs Motion for Injunctive Relief is denied, for those reasons set out in

defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Injunctive Relief.
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3.

Plaintiffs Motion for Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs is denied for those

reasons set out in defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Award of
Attorneys Fees and Costs, defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Tax Costs
and Attorneys Fees, and their Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Tax Costs and
Attorneys Fees.
4.

Based upon the foregoing rulings and upon the jury verdict in this matter, final

judgment is hereby entered as follows:
a.

Judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc., and

against defendants Gregory Smedsrud and LouAnn Smedsrud, jointly and
severally, in the amount of $7,076.56, together with interest thereon from and
after May 22, 2002 until paid in full at the contract rate of 12% per annum.
b.

Judgment is hereby entered in favor of defendants Gregory and LouAnn

Smedsrud, jointly and severally, and against plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc.,
in the following amounts:
i.

$1,906.94, representing defendants' costs of suit incurred prior to

May 9, 2002;
ii.

$48,083.10, representing defendants' attorneys fees incurred prior

to May 9, 2002;
iii.

$766.50, representing defendants' costs of suit incurred on and

after May 9, 2002;
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iv.

$33,280.00, representing defendants' attorneys fees incurred on

and after May 9, 2002; and
v.

Interest on the foregoing amounts from and after May 22, 2002

until paid in full, at the contract rate of 12%.
c.

It is further ordered that the award of defendants' costs and attorneys fees

as set out above may be augmented in an amount equal to all costs and attorneys
fees incurred by defendants' from and after June 1, 2002 in the enforcement
and/or collection of the judgment entered herein, upon further application as
supported by affidavit of defendants' counsel.
5.

Plaintiffs petition for an order of foreclosure of its mechanic's lien herein is

denied, as its judgment against Smedsruds, as the owners, is fully offset by judgment in favor of
Smedsruds herein.
6.

Plaintiff is hereby ordered to release all liens and notices of liens placed by or for

it upon the Smedsruds' residence located in Summit County, State of Utah, more particularly
described as follows:
All of Lot 118, PINERIDGE SUBDIVISION, according to the
official plat thereof filed in the office of the Recorder of Summit
County, State of Utah.
(hereafter "Smedsrud Property"). Plaintiff is hereby declared to hold no right, title or interest in
and to the Smedsrud Property. Plaintiff is further ordered to release any and all Notices of Lis
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Pendens filed against the Smedsrud Property with the Summit County Recorder's office in
connection with this action.
7.

Defendants Butterfield Lumber, Inc., Pella Products, Inc., Blaze Wharton

Construction, Inc., Dixie Woodworks, Inc., and Jeffrey Kaiser, having failed to present any proof
to the court in support of any claims which they have or may have against any party hereto, or to
obtain any verdict or judgment in their favor, are determined to hold no right, title or interest in
and to the Smedsrud Property, whether jointly or severally, by virtue of any right of mechanic's
lien asserted by or on behalf of said defendants (or any of them) against the Smedsrud Property.
Said defendants are hereby ordered to release all liens and notices of mechanics' or
materialman's lien placed by or for them upon the Smedsrud Property.
8.

Any and all claims asserted by or against any party to this action, to the extent not

otherwise addressed in this judgment and order, are hereby deemed dismissed with prejudice and
on the merits.
DATED this

l^f

day of August, 2002.
BY THE COURT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the , "

day of August, 2002,1 caused to be hand-delivered a

true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed form of JUDGMENT UPON VERDICT AND
ORDER ON POST TRIAL MOTIONS to the following:
Ray G. Martineau
Anthony R. Martineau
Brett D. Cragun
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Scott L. Wiggins
ARNOLD & WIGGINS
American Plaza II, ste. 105
57 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Randall R. Smart
Snow, Nuffer
341 South Main Street, #303
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

/;

Ralph R. Tate
4625 South 2300 East, Ste. 206
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
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Tab 4

VINCENT C. RAMPTON (USB #2684)
ROSS I. ROMERO (USB #7771)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Gregory andLouAnn Smedsrud
170 South Main Street, Suite #1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

C<A-mz

WRIT OF GARNISHMENT

J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a
Corporation
Plaintiff-Counterclaim defendant,
vs.

Civil No. 020901328

GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFDELD LUMBER,
INC., a Corporation; PELLA PRODUCTS,
INC., a Corporation; BLAZE WHARTON
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Corporation;
DLXIE WOODWORKS, INC., a Corporation;
and JEFREY KAISER, doing business as RIO
GRANDE PAINTING,

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

DA !

" t-tfr/fi

TIME

UPO!

<Jx.

CPS<W* F

DEPUTY/SERVER

Defendants- Counterclaim Plaintiffs.
THE STATE OF UTAH TO: ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, Garnishee.
You are hereby ordered and commanded by the Court to hold, until further order of
this Court, and not pay to Plaintiff any or all money and other personal property of the
Plaintiff in your possession or under your control, whether now due or hereafter to become
due, which are not exempt from execution, up to the amount remaining due on the judgment
or order plus court approved costs in this matter, after offsets being $ 76,959.98.
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You are required to answer the attached questions called interrogatories, and file your
answer with the Clerk of the Court within five business days of the date this Writ is served
upon you. The address of the Clerk is: 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
You are also required to send a copy of your answers to the Defendants, Greg and LouAnn
Smedsrud at the following address: Ross Romero, Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough,
170 South Main Street, Suite #1500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.
If you fail to answer, the judgment creditor may ask the Court to make you pay the
amount you should have withhold.
If you are indebted to or hold property or money belonging to the Plaintiff, you shall
immediately mail by first class mail a copy of the Writ of Garnishment and your answer to
the Interrogatories, the Notice of Garnishment and Exemptions and two (2) copies of the
Request for Hearing to the Plaintiff and to anyone else who, according to your records, may
have an ownership or other interest in the property or money at the last known address of the
Plaintiff or such other persons shown on your records at the time of the service of this Writ.
In lieu of mailings, you may hand-deliver a copy of these documents to the Plaintiff and
other persons entitled to copies.
YOU MAY DELIVER to the officer serving this Writ the portion of Plaintiff s
earnings or income to be held as shown by your answers. You will then be relieved from
further liability in this case unless your answers are successfully disputed. You may, in the
alternative, hold the money until further order of the Court.
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If you do not receive an order from the Court regarding this Writ and the property
you held pursuant to this Writ within sixty (60) days after filing your answers to the attached
Interrogatories, this Writ shall expire and you may ignore it.
DATED this j £ _ day of September, 2002.

CLERK OF THE COURT

Serve Zions First National Bank at:
Robert A. Goodman
Legal Services Department, 232-K5
One South Main Street, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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INTERROGATORIES TO GARNISHEE
(Not for Earnings for Personal Services)
Page 1 of 3
Case No:
Defendants:
(Give your answers in the spaces provided and attach additional sheets if necessary.)
1.

Are you indebted to the Defendants either in property or money?
ANSWER:

2.

What is the nature of the indebtedness?
ANSWER:

j .

What is the total amount of the indebtedness?
ANSWER:

4.

Is the indebtedness now due?
ANSWER:
If not, when is it to become due?
ANSWER:

6.

Have you in your possession, in your charge, or under your control any property or money
in which Defendants have an interest other than as set forth in your answers above?
ANSWER:

7.

If so, identify or describe such property or money and value of Defendants' interest in it.

Identification or Description

8.

Amount or Value of Defendants' Interest

Do you know of any debts owing or which may be owing from any other person to
Defendants, whether due or not. or of any property of Defendants or in which Defendants
have an interest in any other person's possession or control?
ANSWER:

(RETURN ORIGINAL TO COURT)

f

INTERROGATORIES TO GARNISHEE - CONTINUED
(Not for Earnings for Personal Services)
Pace 2 of 3
Case No:
Defendants:

If so, state the full particulars thereof.
Identification or
Description of Debt
Right or Item

10.

Location

Third Party
Debtor, Holder
or Custodian

Amount or
Value of
Defendants1
Interest

Have you retained or deducted from the property or money in which are indebted to
Defendants any amount in payment, in full or in part, of a debt owed by Defendants or
Plaintiff to you?
ANSWER:

11.

If so, state the amount so retained or deducted and the person indebted for whom the amount
has been retained or deducted.
ANSWER:

12.

Describe any information provided to you by or on behalf of Defendants regarding
Defendants' property, bank accounts, bank relationships, employment, and all other financial
information, e.g., via financial statements, applications, etc. In lieu of a written response to
this interrogator)' request, you may provide copies of any such information provided to you
by or on behalf of Defendants with your response to these interrogatories.
ANSWER:

(RETURN ORIGINAL TO COURT)

INTERROGATORIES TO GARNISHEE - CONTINUED
(Not for Earnings for Personal Services)
Pase 3 of3
Case No:
Defendant^:
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I do swear or affirm that I am the garnishee or person authorized to execute this document
and make this verification on behalf of garnishee and that the answers to the foregoing
interrogatories are true to the best of my information and belief,
I also swear or affirm that I mailed by first class mail, or hand-delivered a copy of the Writ
of Gamisliment, Answers to Interrogatories, Notice of Gamisliment and Exemptions and two (2)
copies of a Request for Hearing, to the Defendants at
on the

day of

»

, 2001.

I also swear or affirm that the following other persons were also provided a copy of the Writ
of Gamisliment, Answers to Interrogatories, Notice of Gamisliment and Exemptions and Request
for Hearing:
Person

Address

Date mailed or delivered

Signature of Garnishee or Authorized
Signature on Behalf of Garnishee
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
•

•S |
|

day of
^

NOTARY PUBLIC
^
My commission expires:

(RETURN ORIGINAL TO COURT)

. 2001.
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VINCENT C. RAMPTON (USB #2684)
ROSS I. ROMERO (USB #7771)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a
Corporation,
Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant,

RULING ON WRIT OF
GARNISHMENT
:

vs.

GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFIELD LUMBER,
INC., a Corporation; PELLA PRODUCTS,
INC., a Corporation; BLAZE WHARTON
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Corporation;
DIXIE WOODWORKS, INC., a Corporation;
and JEFREY KAISER, doing business as RIO
GRANDE PAINTING,
Defendants and Counterclaim
Plaintiffs.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Civil No. 020901328
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

:

Defendants Gregory Smedsrud and Louann Smedsrud having caused a Writ of
Garnishment to issue in the above-entitled proceeding, directed to Zions First National Bank as
Garnishee; said Writ having been served September 10, 2002, upon Zions First National Bank;
557924vl

Zions First National Bank having served its answers to interrogatories incident to said Writ upon
Defendants, and upon the Plaintiff-in-judgment Debtor, J. Pochynok Company, Inc., on
September 13, 2002; and Plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc. having filed a Request for Hearing
pursuant to Rule 64D(h), Utah R. Civ. P., the Smedsrud Defendants' Writ of Garnishment was
called on for hearing by the Court on October 7, 2002, at 9 a.m. Plaintiff J. Pochynok Company,
Inc. was represented by its counsel of record, Brett D. Cragun. The Smedsrud Defendants were
represented by their counsel of record, Vincent C. Rampton of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook &
McDonough.
The Court having heard presentations of counsel, having reviewed all submittals of
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

Plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc. has failed to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that the Writ of Garnishment was issued improperly; that the answers to
interrogatories are inaccurate; or that any assets garnished thereby are exempt from or are not
subject to garnishment;
2.

Plaintiffs Request for Hearing was untimely;

3.

Plaintiffs objections to the Writ of Garnishment are therefore declined;

4.

All assets identified in the answers to interrogatories of Garnishee Zions First

National Bank are subject to garnishment and not exempt;
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5.

Zions First National Bank, as Garnishee, is hereby ordered to pay the Property

Subject to Garnishment, as identified in its answers to interrogatories in response to the
Smedsrud Defendants' Writ of Garnishment, directly to counsel for Defendants Gregory and
LouAnn Smedsrud.
1/

DATED this

day of October, 2002.
BYTH

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

***M*1&1

By:.
Brett D. Cragun
Attorneys for Plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
-

I hereby certify that on the •

••-4

day of October, 2002,1 caused to be mailed by first

class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed RULING ON
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT to the following:
Ray G. Martineau
Anthony R. Martineau
Brett D. Cragun
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Scott L. Wiggins
Arnold & Wiggins
American Plaza II, Suite 105
57 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Randall R. Smart
Snow, Nuffer
341 South Main Street, #303
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

/

Ralph R.Tate
4625 South 2300 East, Suite 206
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
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